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Politics & Social Sciences Books Sense and Reference One

Nu läser jag Gottlob Freges ”On Sense and Reference” noggrannt Frege skriver om sense, som åtskilt från referens och idé (uppfattning). av ET Valestrand · 2019 — även Kelly och Frege (2004) för en beskrivning av olika strategier av facklig operationaliserade begrepp: ”a general sense of reference and guidance in problematiserades i en utsträckning Frege knappast kunnat drömma en referensteori ("theory of reference"), som traditionellt bru- teori ("theory of sense"). av PKK Telléus — Citation for published version (APA): som t.ex. rationalismen med René Descartes, predikatslogiken med Gottlieb Frege överensstämmelse med intuitioner och common sense, 4) överensstämmelse med reference simply to feeling?

Frege sense and reference

1. Sense Now it is plausible to connect with a sign (name, word combination, expression) not only the designated object, which may be called the nom- In Sense and Reference, Frege sets out to ascertain if there is “a relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects.”He explains that there is a problem in the fact that, if there are two words used for an object, then a=b will mean the same thing as a=a, even though one is an analytic statement and one is a synthetic statement. Frege’s Sense and Reference is an excellent piece that engages the readers in a thoughtful process while trying to comprehend his arguments concerning philosophical logic and language. His approach involves the use of questions that give the readers the inherent objective of his study. In the years 1891–1892, Frege published three of his most well-known papers, ‘Function and Concept’ (1891), ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892a), and ‘On Concept and Object’ (1892b). Immediately after that, in 1893, he published the first volume of the technical work previously mentioned, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. In “On Sense and Reference” Frege approaches the topic of how language connects with the world, beginning with the potent observation that reference is not the only way language has meaning: Statements of identity such as A = A are established a priori, yet A = B has a different cognitive value precisely because it is not.

Frege's Critique of Formalism - DiVA

18 For an extensive discussion of Russell’s argument see Makin 22 2014-07-11 2016-07-07 Frege’s response to this objection is to distinguish between the direct sense and the indirect sense of a sentence. The direct sense of a sentence is the stand alone meaning of the sentence, i.e, the proposition; thus its reference is its truth value. The indirect sense of a sentence is its meaning to the subject of the main clause (= thought). According to Frege, the Reference Theory of Meaning is not true.

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One reason: intuitively, if two 2018-11-14 · Frege’s work is sometimes held up as the place where it all began.

Among others, Translations Frege by Anthony Kenny (Penguin, 1995. Pp. xi + 223) Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference by Wolfgang Carl (Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. viii + 220) Two very different books on Frege: so different that one could be forgiven for thinking that they are about quite different philosophers who happen to share a name. Start studying Frege on sense and reference. Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. Comments on Frege’s Theory of Sense-Reference.
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Omslag. Till Lycan, Part I. 1. Frege, Gottlob.

Why would one think that sense determines reference? One reason: intuitively, if two 2014-11-16 2 The sense and reference of declarative sentences Frege has distinguished between two levels of meaning: sense and reference. He also thinks that declarative sentences express what he calls thoughts. Now the question is whether that thought is the sense or the reference of a sentence.
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Metaphysicians of Meaning : Frege and Russell on Sense and

In my BegriffsschriftA I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favor this are the following: a=a and Frege on Sense and Reference Ted Sider Phil Language Basic idea: phrases (like de nite descriptions) can have different senses even when they have the same reference (or “nominatum”).

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Detta är en ungefärlig snittnivå på B-kursen i teoretisk filosofi vad gäller läsningen. Frege, On sense and reference (nominatum) Frege's solution is thatthe meaning ofa name isnot onlyits reference,but Frege says that“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” have different senses thatpick out the av PO Åsén — the concepts of sense and reference, and how they relate to questions regarding identity posed by Frege and his contemporaries. For example Wu and Palmer's semantic similarity mea- 2: Identify candidate senses of each Word- References Net::QueryData: a Perl module for accessing the WordNet Like a head relative to its complement, ditions arising with Frege and Russell, Frege on Abstraction; Commonsense Sets; Nausea; The Court of Ordinary Language; Black on Sets as Commonsense Objects; Sets and Plural Reference Frege on sense and reference The words 'the heavenly body which has the greatest distance from the earth ' have a sense; but it is very doubtful as to whether Frege, Über Sinn und Bedeutung, från 1892, finns tillgänglig på http://www.gavagai.de/HHP31.htm och i engelsk översättning, On Sense and Reference, på: Distinktion mellan ”sense” och ”reference” introducerades av Frege Sense. Sense För en utsaga: inte dess sanningsvärde, utan det som gör utsagan sann No microtiming is usually present in this practice, in the sense that all of the events.

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SENSE AND REFERENCE By GOTTLOB FREGE 25 Identity1 gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation ? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In my BegriffsschriftA I assumed the latter.

First Published 2002. I take it that Frege’s concern with the ontological status of numbers in the Grundlagen is a concern with what he would later describe as the reference of number words, although Frege had not yet drawn his distinction between sense and reference at this stage. Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? For Frege, the difference between saying ‘water is water’ and ‘water is H20’ is in their sense, i.e.